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Abstract: 
 
Individual targeting, a marketing strategy that firms target individual consumers with tailored 
offers, is currently a widespread practice. Customer data intermediaries (CDIs) have emerged 
recently to help firms learn their prospective customers and launch their target marketing 
campaigns. This paper uses a common-value auction framework to study how a CDI designs and 
differentiates its information services to help two competing firms identify and target valuable 
customers. We characterize the firms' equilibrium target marketing strategies. The results show 
that the CDI serves one firm exclusively in unpromising markets where the proportion of 
valuable customers is relatively low, and provides both firms with differentiated services in 
promising markets where the proportion of valuable customers is relatively high. In addition, the 
CDI differentiates its services less when the proportion of valuable customers is higher. 
 
Keywords: Target marketing | Individual targeting | Customer data intermediaries | Information 
economics 
 
Article: 
 
Introduction 
 
The past decade has witnessed the boom of target marketing based on consumer data [10] and 
[11]. For example, retailers provide checkout coupons to consumers based on their past 
purchases. Phone carriers (e.g., AT&T) often lure customers by offering them personalized 
checks depending on consumers' calling history. Credit card companies (e.g., American Express) 
usually issue preapproved credit cards to customers with good credit scores. Banks (e.g., Bank of 
American) often promote diverse financial products with free trials based on their clients' 
account information. 
 
Customer data intermediaries (CDIs) have emerged to help firms implement target marketing. 
CDIs collect individual-level customer data through various online and offline channels and 
facilitate firms to target individual customers with tailored advertisements or promotional 
incentives. For example, Catalina Marketing discovers consumers' shopping habits using data 
collected through its network of 24,000 U.S. and 8000 international merchandiser stores, and 
provides its clients various target marketing services, such as checkout coupons, quick cash and 
shopping lists.1 DoubleClick tracks Web users by name and address as they move from one 
website to the next, and helps firms deliver targeted banner advertisements.2 Pancras and Sudhir 
[15] summarize major CDIs and their services. The CDI services significantly improve the 
effectiveness of target marketing campaigns. For example, the average redemption rate of 
Catalina Marketing incentives (coupons) is about 6.3%, more than eight times greater than other 
non shopper-driven traditional promotional methods.3 As firms compete aggressively using 
target marketing, CDIs play an important role in shaping the firms' competition. 
 
Considering the growing importance of CDIs, there is a need to study CDIs' businesses from 
strategic perspectives. In different markets, CDIs employ significantly diverse business strategies 
[15]. Some CDIs offer their services on an exclusive basis and others offer on a nonexclusive 
basis. For example, Catalina only sells its services exclusively, but Abacus and I-Behavior sell 
on a nonexclusive basis to any catalog marketer or specialty retailer. It is important to understand 
what drives such diversity in CDIs' businesses. In addition, when the CDIs offer nonexclusive 
services, the CDIs often offer services with differential levels of service differentiation. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine how the CDI's service differentiation influences market 
competition and how the CDI makes strategic decisions on service differentiation. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of CDI services on firm competition and 
explain the diversity of CDIs' business strategies. We develop a model in which a CDI may help 
two competing firms identify and target valuable prospective customers. Compared to the firms, 
the CDI can better segment prospective customers based on the data it collects. With the CDI's 
services of customer segmentation, firms can better tailor promotional incentives to different 
customer segments. Using this model, we examine the CDI's selling strategy of its services. In 
particular, when should the CDI offer the service to only one firm exclusively and when should 
the CDI serve both firms? If the CDI serves both firms, how should it differentiate its services 
between firms? Because the CDI's service strategies influence the firms' competition, our model 
also characterizes how firms compete using target marketing. 
 
The existing research on firm competition with target marketing largely focuses on horizontally 
differentiated firms (e.g., [3], [4], [8], [9], [12], [13], [16] and [17]). The individual-level 
customer information is used to discover the customers' brand preferences (i.e., horizontal 
preferences). This study, in contrast, considers the individual-level information about customers' 
heterogeneous preferences to the product itself (i.e., vertical preferences). Our model captures 
the competition between two firms selling identical products. Therefore, the valuable customers 
are equally valuable to both firms, and the firms' competition exhibits the features of common-
value auction (e.g., [6] and [14]). The focus on the customer's product preference, instead of the 
brand preference, enables us to gain useful insights that are not captured in the existing literature. 
For example, the existing literature generally suggests that the decrease in information 
asymmetry among firms softens their competition for each other's loyal customers (who are 
valuable to only one firm), but intensifies their competition for comparison shoppers (common-
value customers) when firms can better distinguish comparison shoppers from loyal customers 
(e.g., [3]). However, our study reveals that the decrease in information asymmetry among firms 
does not always intensify their competition for common-value customers. 
 
This study also relates to the research on quality differentiation of information product/service. 
The existing literature has well explored this issue from the standpoints of monopolist sellers 
(e.g., [1] and [19]) or competing sellers (e.g., [5] and [21]). However, quality differentiation by 
the information intermediary has received relatively less attention. Bhargava and Choudhary [2] 
show that an information intermediary can provide quality-differentiated services and benefit 
from positive cross-network effects. Weber and Zhang [22] consider how a search intermediary 
provides differentiated paid referral services through the design of search ranking. These models, 
in line with most of traditional quality differentiation models, assume that the users have 
heterogeneous preferences to product quality. In contrast, our model considers the case that firms 
(i.e., users) are ex ante homogeneous and the firm heterogeneity is completely endogenized by 
the intermediary (i.e., the CDI) through service differentiation. Our model illustrates a different 
strategic effect of quality differentiation, i.e., the CDI's service design influences the competition 
between homogeneous firms in target marketing. A similar issue has been explored in the studies 
on referral infomediaries (e.g., [4] and [7]). These models, however, only consider the use of 
service exclusivity as a differentiation approach. Our model also considers the use of non-
exclusive services with differentiated information quality as a differentiation approach. In 
addition, this study also explores how market conditions influence CDIs' business strategies. Our 
model considers both the promising markets where the majority of prospective customers are 
valuable customers and the unpromising markets where the majority of prospective customers 
are non-valuable customers. The analysis characterizes how the CDI's service strategies are 
dependent on the market conditions. The results help explain the diversity of CDIs' strategies 
across different markets, and also provide managerial implications on the CDI businesses in 
different markets. 
 
The findings of this study are as follows. The study finds that when the CDI provides firms more 
similar information about the common-value customer (i.e., less differentiated services), the 
firms' competition may be softened. Although some prior studies (e.g., [3]) also suggest that 
information similarity may soften firm competition, their analyses are based on the models with 
ex ante differentiated firms. Our model generates this finding in the setting where firms are ex 
ante   homogeneous and the firm differentiation is completely endogenized by the CDI. Our 
model also characterizes when the decrease in information asymmetry between firms softens the 
competition and when it intensifies the competition. This insight generates important 
implications for the CDI's service strategies. When the CDI serves both firms, adjusting the 
service differentiation between firms allows the CDI to maintain a desirable level of firm 
competition and maximize its profit from selling information services to firms. Based on the 
results of firm competition, the study characterizes the optimal service strategies for the CDI. 
The analysis suggests that in unpromising markets where the proportion of valuable customers is 
relatively small (i.e., the proportion of valuable customers is lower than ), the CDI serves 
only one firm exclusively. However, in promising markets where the proportion of valuable 
customers is relatively large (i.e., the proportion of valuable customers is higher than ), the 
CDI serves both firms but provides differentiated services. The study also characterizes the 
optimal degree of service differentiation. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model setup. Section 3 
examines the firms' competition and Section 4 characterizes the service strategies of the CDI. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Model setup  
 
We model a case where two firms, firm 1 and 2, compete in acquiring a group of prospective 
customers. A prospective customer, once acquired by a firm, can bring the firm sales revenue 
over her lifetime business relationship with the firm. We assume that there are two types of 
customers: valuable customers and non-valuable customers. We use V to denote the customer 
value. A valuable customer, once acquired by a firm, can generate a positive amount of revenue 
R > 0 for the firm. Therefore, the value of a valuable customer is V = R for the firm. A non-
valuable customer, in contrast, does not generate any revenue for the firm, i.e., V = 0. We let T ∈ 
{H,L} denote the type of a customer with T = H representing a valuable customer and T = L 
representing a non-valuable customer. λ is used to denote the prior probability that a prospective 
customer is valuable, and 0 < λ ≤ 1. 
 
Firms compete for prospective customers by offering them promotional incentives. Examples of 
promotional incentives include target coupons, price discounts or other nonmonetary benefits. 
We use mi (i ∈ {1,2}) to represent the monetary value of firm i's targeted promotional incentives. 
In this model, it is assumed that the two firms sell identical products/services and the prospective 
customers have no brand preference. The customers are acquired by the firm which offers them 
the higher promotional incentives. This also implies that the value of customers is the same to 
both firms. Therefore, our model exhibits the features of common-value auctions (e.g., [6] and 
[14]) and distinguishes from the traditional models of target marketing competition (e.g., [3] and 
[4]). Without loss of generality, the model can be simplified as that the two firms compete for a 
representative prospective customer who is valuable with a prior probability of λ. 
 
We assume that firms do not directly observe whether or not the prospective customer is 
valuable. A CDI can help firms identify the customer value and improve their targetability. The 
CDI, armed with vast individual-level customer data collected from multiple sources, is more 
capable to estimate the value of the prospective customer. For example, if the data shows that the 
customer has been active in purchasing over the past few months, this customer is more likely to 
be a valuable customer. Otherwise, the customer is more likely to be a non-valuable customer. 
We model the case where the CDI provides customer segmentation services to firms. 
Specifically, the CDI classifies the customer into one of two segments, a high segment for 
valuable customer or a low segment for non-valuable customers. The CDI's customer 
segmentation service generates value by allowing the firm to be more informative about the 
customer value. That is, if the firm observes that the customer is classified into the high (low) 
segment, it should become more confident that this customer is valuable (non-valuable). With 
the CDI's service of customer segmentation, the firm can customize its promotional incentives 
sent to each segment. 
 
We use S to denote the customer segmentation service that the CDI provides to firm 1. S has two 
potential values, h and l. S = h means that the CDI classifies the customer into the high segment 
for firm 1. S = l means that the CDI classifies the customer into the low segment for firm 1. We 
use Pr(h) and Pr(l) to denote the probability that the customer is classified into the high segment 
(i.e., S = h) for firm 1 and the probability that the customer is classified into the low segment 
(i.e., S = l) for firm 1, respectively. 
 
Note that the customer segmentation S may not be completely accurate. That is, it is possible that 
the valuable (non-valuable) customer is incorrectly classified into the low (high) segment. We 
use ψ to denote the probability that the valuable customer is correctly classified into the high 
segment for firm 1, and use ϕ to denote the probability that the non-valuable customer is 
incorrectly classified into the high segment for firm 1. Therefore, the CDI can increase the 
information accuracy of the customer segmentation S by increasing ψ and decreasing ϕ, e.g. the 
CDI can analyze more historical data and/or apply more strict criteria to select valuable 
customers. We assume that 
 
ψ>ϕ.     (1) 
 
The assumption (1) ensures that the segmentation S provides useful information for firm 1. To 
see that, note that we have 
 
 
 
Using the Bayes rule, we can derive the following posterior beliefs. 
 
 
 
where P(H|h) (P(L|h)) is the posterior probability that the prospective customer is a valuable 
(non-valuable) customer given that the customer is classified into the high segment (i.e., S = h) 
for firm 1, and P(L|l) (P(H|l)) is the posterior probability that the prospective customer is a non-
valuable (valuable) customer given that the customer is classified into the low segment (i.e., S = 
l) for firm 1. 4 The assumption (1) ensures the following inequalities hold. 
 
 
 
Inequalities (3) indicate that the posterior probability of a highsegment (low-segment) customer 
being valuable (non-valuable) is higher than the prior probability, λ (1−λ). Therefore, the CDI's 
segmentation provides firm 1 with useful information about the customer's value. We use E[V|S] 
(S∈{h,l}) to denote the expected customer value for firm 1 given S. 
 
 
 
In addition to firm 1, the CDI decides whether or not to serve firm 2. If the CDI serves 
both firms, it may differentiate its services. For example, if the CDI uses less data and less 
sophisticated business intelligence techniques in serving firm 2, the customer segmentation for 
firm 2 can be less accurate than that for firm 1. To capture the potential service differentiation, 
we use  to denote the customer segmentation for firm 2.  has two potential values,  and .  
=  ( =  ) means that the CDI classifies the prospective customer into the high (low) segment 
for firm 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that when the CDI differentiates services, the 
customer segmentation S for firm 1 is always more accurate than the customer segmentation  
for firm 2. Specifically, we use  and to denote the probabilities of and  
respectively, conditional on the value of S.  and  are defined as follows. 
 
 
 
where ζ∈[0,1] is the similarity factor. It captures to what extent the segmentation  is similar to 
the segmentation S. 5 
 If ζ=1, the segmentation  is the same as S. In this case, the CDI's services to both firms 
are not differentiated. If 0<ζ<1, when S=h, it is more likely that . In other words, when a 
customer is classified into the high segment for firm 1, she is more likely to also be classified 
into the high segment for firm 2. Similarly, when S=l, it is more likely that  However, as 
long as ζ<1, the segmentation  is less accurate than the segmentation S. When ζ=0, given any 
value of S, we have or  with 1/2 probability. This essentially means that the segmentation 
 provides no useful customer information to firm 2. Therefore, we can consider ζ= 0 as the case 
that the CDI does not serve firm 2 (i.e., the CDI serves firm 1 exclusively), and firm 2 just uses 
the prior probability to estimate the customer value. 
 
Given a , the expected value of the customer to firm 2 can be represented as 
 
 
Where  and  are posterior probabilities of S=h and S=l respectively, given a 
Using the Bayes' rule, we have 
 
 
 
 It is worth noting that we have , where T= {H,L}. 
This suggests that  and  . In other words, firm 1's information is 
more accurate than firm 2. In addition, we have  > 0 and  > 0. This means that an 
increase of ζ increases the accuracy of firm 2's information. With some algebra (more details in 
the Appendix A), we can show the following relationships. 
 
Remark 1. 
 
 
 
The Remark suggests that the segmentation  is less accurate than the segmentation S in 
indicating the value of a customer. Table 1 summarizes the notation of this model. 
 Before we present the model analysis, we first use a numerical example to illustrate the 
model setup. This numerical example will be used throughout the paper to explain the results. 
Suppose that R= 10. The value of the prospective customer is therefore either V=10 or V= 0. In 
other words, a valuable customer brings a revenue income 10 to the firm over her lifetime 
relationship with the firm, whereas a non-valuable customer brings zero revenue. Suppose that 
ψ= 0.8 and ϕ=0.2. That is, if the customer is valuable (non-valuable), the CDI correctly classifies 
this customer into the high segment (low segment) for firm 1 with a probability 0.8. Therefore, 
suppose that λ= 0.6 (i.e., the prior probability of valuable customer is 0.6), we have 
 (i.e., with a probability 0.56, the CDI classifies the customer into the 
high-segment for firm 1). If firm 1 observes that S=h (i.e., a high-segment customer), it expects 
(using the Bayes' Rule) that the customer is a valuable customer with a posterior probability 
 = 0.857 > λ = 0.6. The expected value of the customer is The expected value of the 
customer is E[V|h]= 8.57. On the other hand, if firm 1 observes S=l (i.e., a low-segment 
customer), it expects that the customer is a valuable customer with a posterior probability 1− 
 = 0.273<1−λ = 0.4. The expected value of the customer is E[V|l]= 2.73<E[V|h]. 
 
 
 Suppose that the CDI provides a differential service to firm 2 with a similarity factor 
ζ=0.5. Then we have  = 0.75. This means that if the CDI classifies the 
customer into the high segment (low segment) for firm 1, it also classifies this customer into the 
high segment (low segment) for firm 2 with a probability 0.75. Therefore, according to Eq. (6), 
when firm 2 observes  (i.e., a high-segment customer), it expects that the customer is also a 
high-segment customer for firm 1 with a posterior probability  . Firm 2 thus 
expects the value of the customer to be  When firm 2 observes  (i.e., a low-
segment customer), it expects that the customer is also a low-segment customer for firm 1 with a 
posterior probability  = 0.70. Firm 2 thus expects the value of the customer to be 
. Note that we have , which means that 
the segmentation S for firm 1 is more accurate in revealing the customer value than the 
segmentation for firm 2. 
 The timing of events is as follows. First, the CDI designs the segmentation S for firm 1 
by determining ψ and ϕ. In addition to firm 1, the CDI decides whether or not to also serve firm 
2. If the CDI also serves firm 2, it determines ζ to differentiate the segmentation  for firm 2 
from the segmentation S for firm 1. The CDI also determines how much to charge each firm. 
After determining all these details, the CDI makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to firms. Second, 
firms determine whether to accept the CDI's offers and use the CDI's services. Firms who use the 
CDI's services observe the customer segmentation (firm 1 observes the customer segmentation S 
and firm 2, if served, observes the customer segmentation ). Third, firms simultaneously decide 
their promotional incentives sent to the prospective customer, mi, where i= 1, 2. Finally, the 
customer patronizes the firm which offers the higher promotional incentive. The value of the 
customer is realized for the winning firm. We assume that everything is common knowledge 
except the customer's value V and the firms' segmentations S and . In practice, CDIs such as 
Catalina Marketing often keep their service specifications transparent (e.g., the length of 
transaction history used in data analysis, redemption rate of target marketing services). 
Therefore, we assume that firms can assess the service quality and differentiation (i.e., ψ, ϕ, and 
ζ). 
 
3. Firm competition 
 
Following backward induction, we first consider the firms' competition given the 
customer segmentations, and then consider the CDI's strategies based on the equilibrium of firm 
competition. In this section, we derive the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the firms' competition. 
In the competition, firm i chooses its promotional incentive, mi, to maximize its expected profit, 
denoted by πi, i=1,2. 
 When ζ=1, firms' segmentations are exactly the same. Therefore, firms engage in a 
Bertrand competition. Firms both offer m=E[V|l] when S =  = l and m=E[V|h] when S = =  
h. We next focus on the equilibria when 0 ≤ ζ < 1. We find that no pure-strategy equilibrium 
exists for the firms' competition. Suppose that firm 2 offers a deterministic promotional incentive 
m2. Firm 1 always offers a promotional incentive higher than m2 if E[V|S]>m2. As a result, firm 2 
can only acquire the customer when E[V|S]≤m2 and make a nonpositive profit. This is a typical 
case of Winner's Curse. The only equilibrium is a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In marketing, 
mixed strategies can be interpreted as the frequent dispersion of firms' sales offers or promotions 
[18]. The proof of no pure-strategy equilibrium is in the Appendix A. 
 Let G1(m|S)=Pr(m1≤m|S) denote the equilibrium cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of firm 1's promotional incentive conditional on its customer segmentation S. Let 
 denote the equilibrium CDF of firm 2's promotional incentive 
conditional on its customer segmentation . Firm 1's expected profit when offering m1, 
conditional on S, can be represented as 
 
 
 
 The first term in the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (7) is firm 1's expected profit when the 
customer is classified into the high segment for firm 2 (i.e., ). The second term is firm 1's 
expected profit when the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 2 (i.e. ) 
Similarly, firm 2's expected profit when offering m2, conditional on  can be represented as 
 
 
 
 The first term in the RHS of Eq. (8) is firm 2's expected profit when the customer is 
classified into the high segment for firm 1 (i.e., S=h). The second term is firm 2's expected profit 
when the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 1 (i.e., S=l). Proposition 1 
characterizes the equilibrium distributions of firms' promotional incentives when Pr(h)≤Pr(l) 
(i.e., for firm 1, the customer is more likely to be classified into the low segment than into the 
high segment). 
 
Proposition 1. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l) and 0 ≤ ζ < 1, 
 
1. If the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 1 (i.e., S=l), firm 1 offers a 
promotional incentive m1=E[V|l];  
2. If the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 2 (i.e., ), firm 2 offers a 
promotional incentive m2=E[V|l];  
3. If the customer is classified into the high segment for firm 1 (i.e., S=h), firm 1 offers a 
randomized promotional incentive with the CDF 
 
 
 
4. If the customer is classified into the high segment for firm 2 (i.e., S˜ ¼ h˜ ), firm 2 offers 
a randomized promotional incentive with the CDF , firm 2 offers a randomized 
promotional incentive with the CDF 
 
 
 
 To help understand how firms compete given the customer segmentations, we use a 
numerical example to illustrate Proposition 1. In this example, we use the same specifications as 
in the numerical example in the previous section. Specifically, R= 10, ψ= 0.8, ϕ= 0.2, and ζ=0.5. 
Therefore, we have  We let λ= 0.4 (i.e., the prior probability of valuable 
customer is 0.4). We therefore have Pr(h)=0.44, i.e., with a probability 0.44, the customer is 
classified into the high-segment for firm 1. Note that Pr(h) < Pr(l)=0.56. With this Pr(h), we can 
derive the following expected values 
 
 
and CDFs 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1(a) depicts the supports of firms' promotional incentive distributions when 
Pr(h)≤Pr(l). As Proposition 1 shows, when S=l, firm 1 expects that the customer value is 
E[V|l]=1.43. Firm 1 is thus unwilling to offer any promotional incentive higher than 1.43. 
Because the lowest expected value of the customer across firms 1 and 2 is also 1.43 and both 
firms compete for the customer, firm 1's promotional incentive for the customer is always m1= 
1.43 and firm 1's expected profit is zero. When S=h, firm 1's expected value for the consumer is 
E[V|h]= 7.27, which is higher than  and . Therefore, firm 1 is more willing to win this 
customer than firm 2. In equilibrium, firm 1 randomizes its promotional incentive in such a way 
that firm 2 earns a zero expected profit. 
 
 
 
 Now let us consider firm 2's strategies. When  firm 2 expects that the customer 
value is  We find that firm 2's equilibrium strategy is also to offer a 
deterministic promotional incentive m2=E[V|l]=1.43. Firm 2 gives up the competition because of 
its information disadvantage. When the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 1 
(S=l), firm 2 can win for sure if it offers m2> 1.43. However, it is very likely that firm 2 acquires 
a non-valuable customer and its expected profit is negative. In this case, firm 2 may suffer from 
the Winner's Curse. On the other hand, when the customer is classified into the high segment for 
firm 1 (S=h), firm 1 will compete aggressively for this customer and randomize its promotional 
incentive in a way that firm 2 cannot make a positive expected profit. Therefore, when  
firm 2 cannot do better than offering m2=E[V|l]=1.43 (and making zero expected profit). 
 When  firm 2 randomizes its promotional incentive. The upper bound of the firms' 
promotional incentive distributions is 5.54 because  is the highest expected value 
for firm 2. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, firm 1 and firm 2 randomize their promotional 
incentive over the same support [1.43,5.54]. Fig. 2 depicts the CDFs of firms' promotional 
incentives . Note that  has a mass point at the lower bound m= 
1.43. This means that firm 2 provides m2=1.43 with a positive probability of 0.06.  
 Next, we consider the case when  (i.e., for firm 1, the customer is more likely 
to be classified into the high segment than into the low segment). Eq. (2) indicates that 
occurs if and only if . Also, when ϕ>0.5, we always have 
.This means that we have  when ϕ is sufficiently large. Proposition 2 characterizes 
the equilibrium distributions of firms' promotional incentives when . 
 
Proposition 2. When  and 0 ≤ ζ < 1, 
1. If the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 1 (i.e., S=l), firm 1 offers a 
promotional incentive m1=E[V|l]; 
2. If the customer is classified into the low segment for firm 2 (i.e., ), firm 2 offers a 
randomized promotional incentive with the CDF 
 
 
 
 
3. If the customer is classified into the high segment for firm 1 (i.e., S=h), firm 1 offers a 
randomized promotional incentive with the CDF 
 
 
4. If the customer is classified into the high segment for firm 2 (i.e., ), firm 2 offers a 
randomized promotional incentive with the CDF 
 
 
 
 where the cutoff levels, and , are given in the Appendix A.  
To explain Proposition 2, we use a numerical example again. We use the same 
specifications as in the numerical example for Proposition 1. Specifically, R=10, ψ=0.8, ϕ=0.2, 
and ζ=0.5. We let λ=0.6 (i.e., the prior probability of valuable customer is 0.6). We therefore 
have Pr(h)=0.56>Pr(l)=0.44. With this Pr(h), we can derive the following values 
 
and CDFs 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1(b) depicts the supports of firms' promotional incentive distributions when 
Pr(h)>Pr(l). As Proposition 2 shows, when S=l, firm 1 expects that the customer value is 
E[V|l]=2.73 and therefore offers m1= 2.73. When S=h, firm 1 competes less aggressively than it 
does in the case where Pr(h) ≤ Pr(l). In particular, the upper bound of the firms' promotional 
incentives is , which is lower than = 7:36 (i.e., the upper bound when 
Pr(h)≤Pr(l)). 
 In Proposition 2, firm 2 also randomizes its promotional incentive for its low-segment 
customer. When , firm 2 no longer finds it optimal to offer a promotional incentive 
 . Instead, firm 2 competes with firm 1 by randomizing its promotional 
incentive over the support  However, in equilibrium, firm 2 still earns a 
zero expected profit in competing for its low-segment customer. This is because firm 1 has 
information advantage and randomizes its promotional incentive in such a way that firm 2 cannot 
gain a positive expected profit from its low-segment customer. Fig. 3 shows the CDF of firm 2's 
promotional incentive when . Note that  has a mass point at 
 This means that when , firm 2 provides  with a positive 
probability of 0.977. 
 Proposition 2 indicates that when firm 1 randomizes its promotional incentive to its high-
segment customers (i.e., S=h), the equilibrium distribution function is kinked at 
. This is caused by the difference between the customer segmentation for firm 1 and 
that for firm 2. The high-segment customer for firm 1 may be classified into either the high 
segment (i.e., ) or low segment (i.e., ) ) for firm 2. Firm 2 randomizes its promotional 
incentives over  when  and over  when . Firm 1's promotional 
incentives targeting its high segment have to compete with these two types of firm 2's 
promotional incentives. Therefore,  is kinked at Fig. 3 shows the CDF of firm 1's 
promotional incentive when S=h, i.e., , and the CDFs of firm 2's promotional incentive, 
 and . 
 Next, we consider the firms' expected profits in competition. We use and to denote 
the expected profits of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Proposition 3 summarizes the equilibrium 
profits of firms in competition. 
 
 
 
Proposition 3. When 0≤ ζ < 1, in equilibrium, 
 
1. If Pr(h)≤Pr(l), firm 1 makes a positive expected profit  = , and 
firm 2 makes zero expected profit; 
2. If , , firm 1 makes a positive expected profit = . Firm 2 
makes a positive expected profit  =  when ζ>0, and a zero expected 
profit when ζ=0; 
3. Firm 1's expected profit is always higher than firm 2's expected profit. 
 
Proposition 3 illustrates and compares firms' expected profits. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), only 
firm 1 earns a positive expected profit in competition. We ignore the trivial case of π1=0 when 
Pr(h)=0 (i.e., the customer is never classified into the high segment for firm 1). Note that 
compared to firm 2, firm 1 has more accurate customer segmentation, and thus better information 
about the customer. Therefore, it earns a positive information rent in competition. Such finding is 
consistent with the existing literature on common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed 
bidders [6]. 
When Pr(h)>Pr(l), however, Proposition 3.2 illustrates that both firms earn positive 
expected profits in competition when 0bζb1. In other words, both firms reap information rents 
when the CDI serves both of them but provides differentiated services. Note that even though the 
customer segmentation for firm 2 is not as accurate as that for firm 1, firm 1 does not directly 
observe the segmentation outcome for firm 2. Thus firm 2's information about the customer is 
also private information although this information is not as good as firm 1's private information. 
Firm 2 can therefore earn information rent from this private information. Proposition 3.3 shows 
that firm 1's information rent is always higher than that of firm 2. This result is intuitive since 
firm 1 has better customer information than firm 2. 
Proposition 3 presents an important insight on the competition between two firms with 
asymmetric information. Firm 2, even though less informed, also has private information. 
However, whether firm 2 can reap information rent from this private information is dependent on 
firm 1's information, i.e., whether the condition Pr(h)>Pr(l) holds. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), firm 1 
competes aggressively and strives to win the customer when S=h, regardless of whether it is a 
high-segment or low-segment customer for firm 2. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, firm 1 
randomizes its promotional incentives in such a way that firm 2 cannot make any positive 
expected profit in the competition when  or  However, when Pr(h)>Pr(l), firm 1 
competes less aggressively and focuses on winning firm 2's low-segment customer. In other 
words, since firm 1 identifies this customer as a valuable customer most of the time, firm 1 
would like to take the chance that firm 2 may not identify this customer in the same way as firm 
1. By doing so, firm 1 saves its expenditure on promotional incentive although it will more likely 
lose the competition. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, firm 1 randomizes its promotional 
incentives in such a way that firm 2 cannot make positive expected profit in the competition 
when  However, if the customer happens to be in firm 2's high-segment ( ), the less 
aggressiveness of firm 1 enables firm 2 to make a positive expected profit when 0 < 
ζ < 1. That is why firm 2's overall expected profit is  =  .  
Proposition 3 captures the case where 0≤ζb1. If ζ= 1, the customer segmentations for firm 
1 and for firm 2 are the same and there is no service differentiation. In this case, firms have the 
same information about the value of the customer. They engage in a head-to-head competition 
and neither makes a positive profit (i.e., π1=π2=0). In this regard, the service differentiation helps 
firms avoid the destructive head-to-head competition. 
We next examine how service differentiation influences the firm profits in competition. 
The degree of service differentiation is captured by ζ. When ζ increases, the customer 
segmentations for the two firms become more similar. Thus, the increase of ζ reduces the service 
differentiation between firms. Proposition 4 characterizes how the change in ζ influences the 
firms' expected profits. 
 
Proposition 4 
 
1. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), firm 1's expected profit is always decreasing in ζ; firm 2's expected 
profit is always zero; 
2. When Pr(h)>Pr(l), firm 1's expected profit is increasing in ζ when ζ∈[0,max{0,ζ1}] and 
decreasing in ζ when ζ∈[max{0,ζ1}, 1], firm 2's expected profit is increasing in ζ when 
ζ∈[0,ζ2] and decreasing in ζ when ζ∈[ζ2,1]. The cutoff levels ζ 1 =  
< ζ 2 =  where γ=Pr(h). 
 
When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), only firm 1 makes a positive expected profit in competition (see 
Proposition 3). When ζ increases, firm 2's information is more similar to firm 1's information. A 
higher ζ leads firm 2 to be more confident that its high-segment customer is more likely to be a 
high-segment customer for firm 1. Therefore, firm 2 is more willing to compete for its high-
segment customer. Consequently, firms compete more head-to-head and firm 1's expected profit 
decreases. 
When Pr(h)>Pr(l), both firms make positive expected profits in competition when ζ>0. 
Again, the increase in ζ results in less service differentiation and more similar information for 
firms. However, Proposition 4.2 shows that firms' profits are not monotonically decreasing in ζ. 
This is because the change in ζ generates two countervailing effects on firm 2's competitive 
aggressiveness. In addition to the effect we discussed in the above paragraph, a higher ζ also 
generates another effect—when ζ increases, firm 2 is also more confident that its lowsegment 
customer is more likely to be a low-segment customer for firm 1. Therefore, firm 2 is less willing 
to compete for its low-segment customer. In the case of Pr(h)≤Pr(l), only the first effect exists. 
Therefore firms' profits are never increasing in ζ. In the case of Pr(h)>Pr(l), both effects exist. 
Whether or not firm 2 becomes more aggressive in general depends on the tradeoff between 
these two countervailing forces. When ζ is small enough, the likelihood that the customer is 
classified into the low segment for firm 2 is relatively high and thus the first force is dominant. 
As a result, the increase in ζ makes firm 2 less aggressive in general. The firms' competition is 
softened. When ζ is large enough, the likelihood that the customer is classi- fied into the high 
segment for firm 2 is relatively high and thus the second force is dominant. As a result, the 
increase in ζ makes firm 2 more aggressive in general. The firms' competition is intensified. 
We next illustrate the impact of information similarity ζ on the competition intensity 
using firms' expected promotional incentives. When firms compete more (less) aggressively, 
they offer higher (lower) promotional incentives. The firms' expected promotional incentives, 
E[m1] and E[m2], can be used to capture the firms' competitive aggressiveness. E[m1] and E[m2] 
are the average levels of firms' promotional incentives, weighted by the probability distributions 
of mixed-strategies (G1(m|S) and  and the probabilities of segmentation outcomes (Pr(S) 
and ). Firms 1 and 2's overall expected promotional incentives are respectively. 
 
 
 
 When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), firms 1 and 2's expected promotional incentives given a signal are 
respectively 
 
 
 When Pr(h)>Pr(l), firms 1 and 2's expected promotional incentives given a signal are 
respectively 
 
 
  
 Fig. 4 illustrates how E[m1] and E[m2] change with ζ. The parameter specifications used 
in Fig. 4 are consistent with those in the numerical examples for Propositions 1 and 2. 
Specifically, R=10, ψ= 0.8, and ϕ=0.2. We use λ= 0.4 for Fig. 4(a) and λ=0.8 for Fig. 4(b) to 
better illustrate the effect. Fig. 4(a) shows that both E[m1] and E[m2] are always increasing in ζ 
when Pr(h)≤Pr(l). Firms compete more aggressively when the level of information asymmetry 
becomes lower. Fig. 4(b) shows that both E[m1] and E[m2] are first decreasing and then 
increasing in ζ when Pr(h)>Pr(l). This indicates when ζ is small, the increase of ζ makes both 
firms less aggressive in offering promotional incentives. In other words, the increase of ζ softens 
the competition. This explains why both firms' expected profits are increasing in ζ when ζ is 
small. When ζ is large, the increase of ζ makes both firms more aggressive in offering 
promotional incentives. In other words, the increase of ζ intensifies the competition. This 
explains why both firms' expected profits are decreasing in ζ when ζ is large. 
 
 
 
3. CDI service design 
 
In this section, we consider the CDI's strategies in providing services of customer 
segmentation to firms. Given the competition equilibrium characterized in the previous sections, 
we consider the CDI's decision on the optimal level of similarity factor ζ. If ζ=0,  does not 
provide additional information to firm 2 and firm 2 only knows the prior probability of valuable 
customer. It is equivalent to the case that the CDI serves firm 1 exclusively. If 0 < ζ < 1, firms 
have different information about the customer. It can be considered as the case that the CDI 
serves both firms but provides differentiated services. If ζ=1, the CDI serves both firms and there 
is no service differentiation. As a result, firms have the same information about the customer.  
If the CDI only serves one firm, it can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to firm 1 at a price 
π1 and let firm 1 decide whether or not to accept it. If firm 1 does not accept it, the CDI makes 
the same offer to firm 2. In equilibrium, firm 1 accepts the offer. The logic is as follows. As 
Proposition 3 shows, the firm with private information makes a positive profit and the firm 
without private information makes zero profit. If firm 1 rejects the offer but firm 2 accepts it, 
firm 1 becomes the firm without private information and will earn zero profit in competition. If 
neither firm accepts the offer and hence neither firm has private information, the competition 
becomes Bertrand competition and both firms make a zero profit. Therefore, firm 1 is willing to 
accept the offer. In equilibrium, the CDI earns a profit Π=π1. In other words, the CDI 
appropriates all the surplus. 
If the CDI serves both firms, in line with the existing literature (e.g., [4,20]), the CDI can 
make take-it-or-leave-it offers sequentially to the two firms. The CDI offers firm 1 a price π1 and 
then offers firm 2 a price π2. If one firm rejects the offer and the other firm accepts the offer, the 
rejecting firm becomes the firm without private information and makes a zero profit in 
competition. If neither firm accepts the offer, again, the competition becomes Bertrand 
competition and both firms make a zero profit. Therefore, both firms are willing to accept the 
offer. In equilibrium, the CDI's profit is 
 
 
 
 The CDI again appropriates all the surplus. Proposition 5 illustrates the impact of the 
similarity factor ζ on the CDI's profit. 
 
Proposition 5.  
 
1. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), the CDI's expected profit is always decreasing in ζ 
2. When Pr(h)>Pr(l), the CDI's expected profit is increasing in ζ when ζ∈[0,max{0,ζ0}] and 
decreasing in ζ when ζ∈[max{0,ζ0},1] where ζ0 = 
 and γ=Pr(h). Moreover, ζ0 satisfies that ζ1 < 
ζ0 < ζ2. 
 
When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), Proposition 3 shows that only firm 1 earns a positive expected profit in 
competition. Therefore, using a take-itor-leave-it offer, the CDI can appropriate firm 1's surplus 
and earn Π=π1. The CDI's expected profit is always decreasing in ζ because as Proposition 4 
shows, firm 1's expected profit (excluding the service fee) is decreasing in ζ. As a result, the CDI 
will choose ζ= 0, i.e., the CDI serves firm 1 exclusively and thus maximizes the information 
difference between firms. 
When Pr(h)>Pr(l), firms may both earn positive expected profits in the competition. By 
making take-it-or-leave-it offers to both firms, the CDI can appropriate both firms' surplus and 
the CDI's profit is Π=π1+π2. As Proposition 4 shows, when ζ is small enough, the increases of ζ 
may soften the firms' competition. When ζ is large enough, the increase of ζ intensifies the firms' 
competition. As a result, the CDI may benefit by serving both firms and maintaining an 
intermediate level of service differentiation. Proposition 5 indicates that when ζ0> 0, the CDI 
should serve both firms and differentiate the services by choosing the similarity factor ζ0. 
It is worth remarking that , , i.e., the optimal level of similarity is increasing in 
Pr(h) (note that γ=Pr(h)). In other words, when it is more likely that the customer is classified 
into the high segment for firm 1, the CDI makes the two firms' services more similar. The 
rationale is that, on average, both firms profit from the high-segment customer but not from the 
low-segment customer in the competition. When Pr(h) increases, by making firm 2's customer 
segmentation more similar to that of firm 1, the CDI can also make the customer more likely to 
be classified as the high-segment customer for firm 2. In this way, the CDI improves firm 2's 
profitability and eventually appropriates more surplus from firm 2. 
Proposition 6 characterizes how the CDI's service differentiation strategies are based on 
Pr(h). 
 
Proposition 6. When  the CDI only serves firm 1. When  the CDI serves 
both firms and chooses a similarity factor ζ0 (as defined in Proposition 5) to differentiate the 
services to firms. 
 From Proposition 5, the optimal ζ for the CDI is zero when  and is max{0,ζ0} 
when  The condition ζ0> 0 requires that  Therefore, when  
the CDI chooses ζ= 0 i.e., only offering an exclusive service to firm 1. When  the 
CDI chooses ζ=ζ0>0, i.e., the CDI serves both firms and differentiates the services to firms. 
 We use a numerical example to illustrate the CDI's service differentiation. Consistent 
with the previous numerical examples, we assume that R=10, ψ=0.8, and ϕ=0.2. Fig. 5 shows 
how the CDI's optimal ζ changes with Pr(h). The CDI chooses ζ= 0 (i.e., serving only firm 1) 
when When  the optimal ζ0 is increasing in Pr(h). 
 Next we consider how the CDI maximizes its profit by controlling the information 
accuracy of its services. Based on Proposition 3 and Eq. (9), the CDI's profit can be represented 
as 
 
 
 
The CDI chooses ψ, ϕ, and ζ to maximize its profit. By adjusting ψ and ϕ, the CDI 
controls Pr(h) (i.e., the probability that the prospective customer is classified into the high 
segment for firm 1) because Pr(h)=λψ+(1−λ)ϕ (please see Eq. (2)). Therefore, when ψ and ϕ are 
determined, the values of Pr(h) and E[V|h] in Eq. (10) are determined. By adjusting ζ, the CDI 
controls to what extent the segmentation for firm 2 is different from the segmentation for firm 1 
(please see Eq. (4)). When ζ is determined in addition to ψ and ϕ, the values of ,  
and in Eq. (10) are also determined. As Propositions 5 and 6 indicate, the optimal ζ for the 
CDI is essentially dependent on Pr(h). Therefore, when ψ and ϕ are determined, the optimal ζ is 
also determined. The CDI's decision variables are ψ and ϕ. The CDI's problem is 
 
 
 
Proposition 7 shows how the CDI's service design depends on the market composition λ. 
 
Proposition 7.  
 
1. When  the CDI chooses ψ= 1, ϕ= 0 and ζ=0; 
2. When , the CDI chooses ψ=1, ϕ=0 and ζ=ζ0 in differentiating the services to 
firms. 
 
The CDI maximizes its profit by choosing ψ=1 and ϕ= 0. This result is independent of the 
market composition λ. This implication is that if possible, the CDI always maximizes the 
information accuracy for the high-quality service, S. It is not optimal for CDIs to restrict the 
length of transaction history data for use for the high-quality services. As CDIs collect more 
consumer data over time, they should improve the accuracy of its target services using all 
available data when the cost of data storage and processing is controllable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 6 depicts the CDI's profit. As λ increases, it is more likely that the consumer is 
valuable. However, the CDI's profit's is not always increasing in λ even though the CDI's profit 
comes from the valuable consumer via the firms. Another important factor which influences the 
CDI's profit is the competition intensity between firms. When  the CDI only serves firm 
1 exclusively and firm 2 has no information. Firm 1's information advantage is increasing in λ 
when  and decreasing in λ when  . Note that when  the market is 
most uncertain to the uninformed firm (i.e., firm 2) and the firms' competition intensity is lowest. 
Therefore, the CDI's profit is quasiconcave in λ, achieving the maximum level when  
 When  we have  The CDI serves both firms and chooses a positive 
ζ0 in differentiating the services to firms. The information disadvantage of firm 2 is mitigated as 
λ increases because the market becomes less uncertain and the CDI also provides the informative 
segmentation service to firm 2. This hurts firm 1's expected revenue. But the CDI's profit may be 
increasing in λ because firm 2 is able to make a positive profit, which may bring up the total 
profit, in the competition. As λ approaches one, firm 1's information advantage diminishes 
because the market has little uncertainty. Consequently, the CDI's profit approaches zero. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
 This paper studies the case where two firms compete in acquiring prospective customers 
using promotional incentives, and a CDI can provide services of customer segmentation to help 
firms better identify the value of customers. The results show that even when firms compete for 
common-value customers, they may not always compete more aggressively when they have 
more similar customer information. This feature of market competition provides the CDI an 
opportunity to serve competing firms. When the data service of the CDI focuses on revealing the 
consumers' attitudes towards the products (i.e., vertical preferences) not the brands (i.e., the 
horizontal preferences), e.g., in the markets for new products/services, the CDI can still soften 
the competition by providing firms with more similar information about the prospective 
customers. 
 This study also shows how the CDI can use service differentiation to endogenously create 
heterogeneity between firms and influence firm competition. Prior analytical study has examined 
the use of service exclusivity to differentiate firms [4]. This study considers both service 
exclusivity and service differentiation. By providing services with different informational 
accuracy, the CDI can fine-tune the degree of firm differentiation when it serves multiple firms. 
The analysis in this study suggests that the CDI may adopt service exclusivity or service 
differentiation under different market conditions. Specifi- cally, in unpromising markets where 
the majority of customers are non-valuable, the analysis suggests that it is better for the CDI to 
use service exclusivity. In promising markets where the majority of customers are valuable, it is 
better for the CDI to serve both firms with differentiated information services. The use of both 
service exclusivity and service differentiation provides the CDI more flexibility to influence the 
firms' competition. 
 The study also provides many other opportunities for future research. First, this study 
presents the insight on how the CDI uses its service to endogenously differentiate between 
competing firms. Future research may incorporate the exogenous horizontal differentiation 
between firms and consider the CDI's service strategies for ex ante heterogeneous firms. Such 
analysis with various types of firm differentiation may generate additional insights on the CDI's 
service design. Second, future research may empirically test the relationship between the market 
conditions and the CDI's business strategies, as predicted by this study. Third, future research 
may consider target marketing instruments other than targeted promotional incentives, such as 
targeted advertising and targeted lowest-price guarantee. Studies on the mix of these marketing 
strategies could generate important insights on how CDIs influence firm competition. 
 
Appendix A. Proof 
 
A.1. Proof of remark 
 
 
Proof. The customer's expected values given S=h and S=l are respectively 
 
 
 
Since ψ>ϕ, we have that  and . Also, since 
 we have 
 
 
Similarly, for firm 2, we have the following expected values 
 
 
 
Where  and  are given by  
 
 
 
Since we have 
 
 
 
Comparing  and , we have  and therefore . Since 
 we have 
 
 
 
Combining Eqs. (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), we have 
 
 
 
A.2. Proof of no pure-strategy equilibrium 
 
Proof. Suppose that firm 1 and firm 2 offer deterministic promotional incentives. Let mh and ml 
denote firm 1's promotional incentive to its high-segment customer and low-segment customer, 
respectively. Let  and  denote firm 2's promotional incentive to its high-segment customer 
and low-segment customer, respectively. According to Remark 1, the expected value of the 
prospective customer is at most E[V|h]. Therefore, we have mS≤E[V|h] (S= {h,l}) and 
 Also, the expected value of the prospective customer is at least E[V|l]. 
Since firms compete for the customer, we have mS≥E[V|l] and .  
 
 Next we consider all possible cases that firms offer deterministic promotional incentives 
and show that none of them can be an equilibrium 
 
1. Suppose that firm 2's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that 
 Firm 1's best response promotional incentives are  or 
and  When firm 1 responds with  , firm 2 wins the customer 
only when the expected value of the customer is  and thus firm 2's expected profit is 
negative. When firm 1 responds with  firm 2 can always increase its 
expected profit by decreasing and just beating  Therefore, such deterministic 
 cannot be in any equilibrium; 
2. Suppose that firm 2's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that 
 Firm 1's best-response promotional incentives are  
or  and  When firm 1 responds with  , firm 2 wins the customer 
only when the expected value of the customer is  and thus its expected profit is 
negative. If firm 1 responds with  firm 2 can always be better off by 
decreasing  and just beating  Therefore, such deterministic  cannot be in 
any equilibrium; 
3. Suppose that firm 2's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that 
 Firm 1's best-response promotional incentives are 
and  Firm 2 wins the customer only when the expected value of the 
customer is  and thus its expected profit is negative. Therefore, such deterministic 
 cannot be in any equilibrium; 
4. Suppose that firm 2's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that  
Firm 1's best-response promotional incentives are , and  In this case, 
firm 2's expected profit is always negative. Therefore, such deterministic  cannot 
be in any equilibrium; 
5. Suppose that firm 2's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that 
Firm 1's best-response promotional incentives are 
and  In this case, firm 2's expected profit is always negative. Therefore, such 
deterministic  cannot be in any equilibrium; 
6. Suppose that firm 2's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that 
 Firm 1's best-response promotional incentives are  
Firm 2's best-response promotional incentives are Firm 1 can 
always be better off by raising  and just beating firm 2's best-response. Therefore, 
such deterministic  cannot be in any equilibrium; 
7. Suppose that firm 1's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that , 
and  Firm 2's best-response promotional incentives are or  
and  or  When firm 2 responds with firm 1 
can always be better off by raising  and overbidding and  Therefore, such 
deterministic  cannot be in any equilibrium; 
8. Suppose that firm 1's deterministic promotional incentives satisfy that  
and  Firm 2's best-response promotional incentives are  Firm 
1 can always be better off by decreasing  and just beating and . Therefore, such 
deterministic  cannot be in any equilibrium.  
 
Considering (1)-(8), we conclude that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium. 
 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Proof. Let π1(m1|h) and π1(m1|l) denote firm 1's expected profits of offering a promotional 
incentive m1 for its high-segment customer (S=h) and its low-segment customer (S=l) 
respectively. Let  and  denote firm 2's expected profit of offering a promotional 
incentive  for its high-segment customer  and its low-segment customer  
respectively.  
 
For the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we first consider the support ranges of firms' randomized 
promotional incentives. Let  and  denote firm 1's upper bound and lower bound of 
promotional incentives respectively for its customer in the two segments,  Let  and 
 denote firm 2's upper bound and lower bound of promotional incentives respectively for its 
customer in the two segments,  Regarding the values of these bounds, we can 
immediately conclude three boundary conditions: 
 
Boundary Condition 1:  Since the lowest expected value is  
and firms compete with each other to win the consumer, no one will offer lower than 
.  
Boundary Condition 2:  That is, a firm will not offer a 
promotional incentive higher than its expected value of the customer. 
Boundary Condition 3:  
 
Lemma A1. Firm 1 always offers a deterministic promotional incentive E[V|l] for its low-
segment customer (S=l). In other word,  
 
Proof. For its low-segment customer (S=l), firm 1's expected value of the customer is  Firm 
1 will not offer any promotional incentive above  That is,  Boundary Condition 
1 indicates that  Therefore, we can conclude that and firm 1 
offers a deterministic promotional incentive to its low-segment customer (S=l). That is, 
 In this case, firm 1 makes a zero expected profit from the 
low-segment, i.e.,  
 
 Using the result of Lemma A1, we can simplify Boundary Condition 3 to 
 and the firms' profit functions as 
 
 
 
Lemma A2. Firm 2's upper bound of the promotional incentive for its low-segment customer 
 is also its lower bound of the promotional incentive for its high-segment customer 
. We define this level as  
 
Proof. We first prove that we cannot have  and then prove that we cannot have 
 
 
 Suppose  The supports of  overlap on  . In the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium, from a high-segment customer  firm 2 always makes a 
constant expected profit  when offering any promotional incentive  
Similarly, from a low-segment customer   , firm 2 always makes a constant expected profit 
 when offering any promotional incentive  Therefore, 
 should be constant for any  
 
 
 
 being constant requires that  is also 
constant. Suppose that  for any  we 
have   Since  we have 
 and hence  Therefore, 
 which indicates that the cumulative probability function  is 
decreasing. However, this cannot be true since a cumulative probability function is 
nondecreasing. Therefore, we cannot have  
 We next prove that we cannot have  Suppose  When  
there is a gap between the supports for  and . As a result, firm 1 will never offer a 
promotional incentive  Firm 1 will not offer  either. This is because 
 and  lead to the same probability of winning but firm 1 pays more at . As a result, 
firm 2 will also never offer  which contradicts the fact that is firm 2's lower bound 
of randomization. Therefore, we cannot have  
 Overall, we exclude both  and  The only possibility is  
 
Lemma A3. is not lower than the lower bound of promotional incentive distribution of firm 1 
for its high-segment customer (S=h), i.e.,  
 
Proof. Suppose  If firm 2 offers any promotional incentive  it only wins 
the customer when the customer is classified as a low-segment customer for firm 1 (S=l) and 
hence earns a negative profit. Therefore,  
 
Lemma A4. Firm 1's upper bound of promotional incentive for its high-segment customer (S=h) 
is equal to firm 2's upper bound of promotional incentive for firm 2's high-segment . 
We define this level as There is no mass point at  for both firms' promotional incentive 
distributions. That is,  
 
Proof. It is straightforward that . We define From Boundary 
Condition 2, we have  
 
We next prove that firms put no mass point at  Suppose that firm 2 puts a mass point 
at  Firm 1 has an incentive to increase  ε to beat firm 2. Therefore,  is not 
the upper bound of firms' promotional incentives. 
Suppose firm 2 does not have a mass point at but firm 1 does. We have  
If firm 2 has an incentive to increase m2 to  to beat firm 1. Therefore, is 
not the upper bound of firms' promotional incentives. If , firm 2's expected profit 
when offering is 
 
 
 
 In other words, firm 2's expected profit is negative. Therefore, we cannot have firm 1 
putting a mass point at either. 
 Overall, we have  
 So far, we can conclude that: 
 
1. The support for  
2. The support for  
3. The support for  
 
We next consider firm 2's expected profit in competition. We first show that , 
i.e., firm 2 cannot make a positive expected profit when  We next consider firm 2's 
expected profit when  Prior literature suggests that when competing with a better-
informed competitor, the less-informed competitor earns a zero expected profit in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium (e.g. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 1983). We use this key finding to form two 
conjectures on the expected profits of firm 2 (the less informed firm) when  
 
Lemma A5. 
 
 
Proof. Suppose  From Eq. (A.6), we have 
 
 
 
 Considering Boundary Conditions 1 and 2, we have  Therefore, 
to satisfy  we must have   is positive only when either of 
the following cases is true: (1)  and firm 1 has a mass point at  
 We next show that the first case  cannot be true. If  is true, firm 1 
makes a zero expected profit when offering  and S=h. However, Boundary Condition 
2 suggests that firm 2 always offers a promotional incentive , which is lower than 
 When S= h, firm 1 can make a positive profit at least by offering  
Therefore, firm 1 should make a positive profit at  when S=h. Therefore, the case, 
 cannot be true. 
 We next show that the second case, i.e.,  and firm 1 has a mass point at  
cannot be true. Because firms cannot both have a mass point at a boundary simultaneously in 
equilibrium, if firm 1 has a mass point at  we must have  and 
 Considering Eq. (A.4), we have  
 
 
 
 If  and  we must have that  is always zero and 
therefore firm 1's expected profit when S=h is always zero. However, this cannot be true as we 
proved above. Therefore, the second case cannot be true.  
 In conclusion, firm 2 must make a zero expected profit when  i.e.  
 Next, we develop the following conjectures: 
 
Conjecture 1: For  and for  In 
other words, firm 2's expected profits from its low-segment customer  and high-
segment customer  are always zero; 
Conjecture 2: For  and for  In 
other words, firm 2's expected profit from its low-segment customer  is always 
zero, but that from its high-segment customer  may be zero or positive. 
 
We will first use Conjecture 1 to derive the equilibrium in Proposition 1. Conjecture 2 
will be used to derive the equilibrium in Proposition 2. Based on Conjecture 1, we have 
 (please see Eq. (5)), we have 
 
 
 
Lemma A6. 
 
  
 
Proof. By Lemma A4 and (A.8), we have  Therefore,  
 
 
Lemma A7.   
 
Proof. Suppose  From Lemma A3, we must have  We plug (A.8) 
into (A.6) and replace m with  we have  
 
 
 
 Because  we have  This contradicts the fact that 
 To ensure that  we must have  Then we also have  
 It is easy to verify that  Therefore,  has no 
mass point at  We can conclude that firm 2 offers  to its low-segment customer 
 That is,   
 We can rewrite firm 1's expected profit from its high-segment customer, given any 
promotional incentive, as 
 
 
 Using Lemma A4 and A6, we can conclude that firm 1's expected profit is 
 from its high-segment customer. Therefore, we have  
 
 
 
Combining the results in Lemma A1, Lemma A7, Eq. (9), and Eq. (11), when 
and  the firms' equilibrium strategies can be characterized as follows: 
 
1. For its low-segment customer (S=l), firm 1 offers E[V|l]; 
2. For its low-segment customer , firm 2 offers  
3. For its high-segment customer (S=h), the CDF of firm 1's promotional incentive is 
 
 
 
4. For its high-segment customer ,  the CDF of firm 2's promotional incentive is  
 
 
 
 We can verify that 
 hold if and only 
if   In other words,  is a sufficient and necessary condition of the 
existence of this equilibrium. 
 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Proof. We consider the case Pr(h)>Pr(l). In the proof of Proposition 1, we used Conjecture 1 to 
derive the equilibrium. We also showed that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 exists if and only if 
Pr(h)≤Pr(l). In the following proof, we will use Conjecture 2 to derive the equilibrium when 
Pr(h)>Pr(l). 
 We will show that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium that firm 2 randomizes over 
for its high-segment customer and over for its low-segment customer. Firm 1 
randomizes over for its high-segment customer. The cutoff levels  and  are to 
be determined.  
 Lemma A5 indicates that , i.e., in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, firm 2 
earns zero expected profit from its low-segment customer. From 
 we have 
 
 
 
 Considering Lemma A4 and the constant expected profits of firms in the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, we have 
 
We therefore can derive 
 
 
And 
 
 
 
 We next derive and  In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we should have 
which can be expressed as follows,  
 
 
 
Where  from Eq. (A.12). Jointly solving Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16), we 
have  
 
 
 
We next verify that E[V|l] is the lower bound of  and , and only  has a 
mass point at . From Eqs. (A.11) and (A.13), we have 
 
(1) When  and when  
(2) If , we have  and   Because firms cannot both 
have a mass point at the lower bound, this cannot be true. 
 
Therefore, in equilibrium,  and  Only firm 
2 has a mass point at the lower bound. 
 
 Combining the results in Lemma A1, Eqs. (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14), when 
Pr(h)>Pr(l) and ζ<1, the firms' equilibrium strategies can be characterized as follows: 
 
1. For its low-segment customer (S=l), firm 1 offers E[V|l]; 
2. For its low-segment customer ( ), firm 2's promotional incentive follows the CDF 
 
 
 
3. For its high-segment customer (S=h), firm 1's promotional incentive follows the CDF 
 
 
 
4. For its high-segment customer  firm 2's promotional incentive follows the CDF 
 
 
 
 We can verify that 
 
and  hold if and only if Pr(h)>Pr(l). In other words, Pr(h)>Pr(l) is a sufficient and 
necessary condition of the existence of the second equilibrium. 
 We can conclude that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 exists if and only if Pr(h)≤Pr(l), 
and the equilibrium in Proposition 2 exists if and only if Pr(h)>Pr(l). Therefore, given a pair of 
Pr(h) and Pr(l), there is only one equilibrium. In other words, these two equilibria we derived are 
unique. 
 To further confirm that the equilibria in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are unique 
equilibria, we consider a potential alternative equilibrium when ζ= 0. When ζ= 0, firm 2 has no 
useful information. Firm 2 can completely ignores its information in competition, i.e., 
randomizes promotional incentive  independent on  Using the similar analysis, we can 
characterize the equilibrium of firm competition as follows: 
 
1. For its low-segment customer (S=l), firm 1 offers E[V|l]; 
2. For its high-segment customer (S=h), firm 1's promotional incentive follows the CDF 
 
 
 
3. Firm 2's promotional incentive follows the CDF 
 
 
 
We can show that  ) is equivalent to  and  is 
equivalent to . Therefore, we can confirm that given a pair 
of Pr(h) and Pr(l), only a unique equilibrium exists. 
 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Proof. We first consider the case when Pr(h)≤Pr(l) (or equivalently, ). For notational 
simplicity, we let γ=Pr(h). For its low-segment customer (S=l), firm 1 offers a deterministic 
promotional incentive and its expected profit from the low-segment customer is zero. For its 
high-segment customer (S=h), firm 1 randomizes its promotional incentive following Eq. (A.8) 
and its expected profit is . Overall, when  and 0≤ζ<1, firm 1's expected 
profit is 
 
 
 
π1= 0 when γ=0, i.e., the customer will never be classified in the high segment for firm 1. This 
case is trivial. We ignore the discussion on this case in the study. We generally say firm 1 makes 
a positive profit when Pr(h)≤Pr(l). Firm 2's expected profit from a customer is always zero 
regardless of the customer's segmentation. Therefore, π2=0. 
 We next consider the case when Pr(h)>Pr(l) (or equivalently, ). For its low-segment 
customer, firm 1 offers a deterministic promotional incentive and its expected profit is zero. For 
its high-segment customer, firm 1 randomizes the promotional incentive following Eqs (A.11) 
and (A.12), and its expected profit is   When  and  firm 1's expected 
profit is 
 
 
 
 Firm 2 earns nothing from its low-segment customer in expectation, but makes a positive 
expected profit  from its high-segment customer. Therefore, when  and 
 firm 2's overall expected profit is  
 
 
 
 When ζ=0, π2=0. When ζ>0, π2>0. We can also verify that π1>π2.  
 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Proof. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), firm 1's expected profit is  The first-
order derivative of π1 w.r.t. ζ is 
 
 
 
 When Pr(h)>Pr(l), firm 1's expected profit is 
 and firm 2's expected profit is 
  The first-order derivative of π1 and π2 w.r.t. 
ζ are respectively 
 
 
 
 We find that:  
 
(1)  if  and  if  where 
 always holds. 
(2)  if  and  if  where  always 
holds 
 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 5 
 
Proof. The CDI's expected profit is Π=π1+π2. 
 
 When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), 
 
 
 
The first-order-derivative of Π w.r.t. ζ is 
 
 
 
When Pr(h)>Pr(l), 
 
 
The first-order-derivative of Π w.r.t. ζ is 
 
 
 
 Therefore,  when  and when  where  
 Note that  always holds. 
 
A.8. Proof of Proposition 6 
 
 
Proof. When Pr(h)≤Pr(l), the CDI's expected profit is always decreasing in ζ. Therefore, the 
CDI will always choose ζ=0. In another word, the CDI only serves firm 1. 
 
 When Pr(h)>Pr(l), the CDI's expected profit is increasing in ζ when  and 
decreasing in ζ when  The CDI will choose  requires 
that  Therefore, the CDI serves two firms and set when  Otherwise, it 
only serves firm 1.  
 It can also be verified that  when γ >  
 
A.9. Proof of Proposition 7 
 
Proof. Substitute the optimal similarity factor ζ0 into Π, we have the following expected profits 
 
(1) When  
 
 
 
 The CDI's problem of profit maximization can be represented as 
 
 
 
 Differentiate Π w.r.t. ψ and ϕ, we have 
 
 
 
Therefore, the CDI will choose ψ=1 and ϕ=0 when  When  we let 
 Differentiate Π w.r.t. ϕ, we have 
 
 
 
Therefore, the CDI will choose ϕ=0 and  
The potential optimal solutions are as follows 
(a) when  
(b) when  
 
(2) When  
 
 
 
 The CDI's profit maximization problem can be represented as 
 
 
 
 Where  
 
 Let  
 
where  is Lagrange multiplier. From the Envelop Theorem, we have  
 
 
 
Where 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the constraints ψ≤1 and ϕ≥0, we have the following solutions: 
(c) If   
(d) If  
 
Based on all the cases (a)–(d), for any specific λ, the optimal solution that gives the highest profit 
Π for the CDI is {ψ= 1,ϕ= 0}. 
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